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ABSTRACT: This paper investigates a recent FDA hearing on the popular breast cancer drug, Avastin. Using 
rhetorical stasis analysis, the authors demonstrate how the FDA hearing procedures exclude patient 
representatives from the decision-making process. The results of this study are suggestive for the development of 
more inclusive hybrid forums for technical decision-making.  
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I’d also like to note that this hearing is taking place within a procedurally corrupt administrative 
process…. None of the voting physicians on the panel appear to be engaged in treating breast cancer 
as a significant part of their clinical research or medical practice. 
—Steve Walker, Co-Founder of the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs 
 
The design of these post-approval studies, which are sometimes called confirmatory studies, is 
proposed by the sponsor and agreed to by CDER [The FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research]. The studies must be carried out with due diligence and they must be “adequate and well-
controlled.” Adequate and well-controlled is a term of art, but, in essence, it means that CDER’s risk-
benefit judgments must be based on data from rigorous clinical trials, not anecdotal information or 
unsubstantiated theories.  
—Richard Pazdur, FDA Center for Drug Evaluation Research  
1. INTRODUCTION 
On June 28th and 29th 2011, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) convened a rare public 
hearing to assess the safety and efficacy of the drug Bevacizumab (trade name: Avastin) for the 
treatment of breast cancer. Avastin was originally approved, or “indicated” in FDA parlance, 
for use with breast cancer patients under a special accelerated approval process in 2008. As 
part of this approval process (designed to get new drugs to patients in need more quickly than 
the regular approval process allows), Genentech (the maker of Avastin) was required to 
conduct a series of “confirmatory trials” to validate the safety and efficacy of Avastin for the 
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treatment of breast cancer in accordance with the more rigorous standards of the regular 
approval process. At the completion of these confirmatory trials, the FDA’s Center for Drug 
Evaluation Research (CDER) ruled that these trials did not succeed. As a result, the breast 
cancer indication for Avastin was revoked. The epigraphs at the top of this paper come from 
the special public appeal hearing that the FDA granted Genentech.  
 In this paper, we suggest that these two passages serve to highlight the key rhetorical 
issue that lies at the heart of the Avastin debate and at the heart of many issues in science and 
health policy, viz., the problem of expertise. In the first passage, Walker argues the CDER 
advisory board, tasked with recommending a course of action regarding the Avastin breast 
cancer indication, lacks the necessary expertise to make such a recommendation because none 
of the board members are involved specifically in the study or treatment of breast cancer. The 
second passage is more oblique, but it ultimately serves the same purpose—to cast doubt on 
the expertise of certain testifying parties, breast cancer patients and non-researching clinicians. 
While the ostensible focus on research methodology avoids direct confrontation, the 
ramifications for this hearing are obvious and serious. In short, the CDER advisory board is 
asked to disregard all testimony from anyone who has not conducted a randomized controlled 
trial (RCT)—the gold standard in medical research. 
 The problem of expertise and its relationship to scientific, technical, or health policy 
has been long recognized in rhetorical studies as well as in science, technology, and health 
studies more broadly (Callon, Lascoumes, & Barthe, 2001; Koerber, 2006; Lyne & Howe, 
1990; Peterson & Horton, 1995; Schwarze, 2003; Wynne, 1989). Building on this 
interdisciplinary tradition, this paper aims to contribute to the evolving understanding of 1) the 
argumentative means by which expertise is leveraged in health policy, and 2) the discursive 
strategies used to delegitimize the expertise of opposing parties. In so doing, we also aim to 
contribute to the growing emphasis on normative arguments for technical policy decisions and 
suggest possible ways the Avastin hearings might have managed multiple and conflicting 
expertise both more ethically and more effectively.  
2. TECHNICAL DECISION MAKING AND THE PROBLEM OF EXPERTISE 
Communications and science-policy scholars are very familiar with the long-standing problem 
of expertise in scientific, technical, and health policy disputes. Generally, this issue has been 
framed in terms of determining how to include the marginalized voices of non-expert classes, 
the so-called “laity,” in technical decision-making. And, indeed, the long history of 
governmental agencies, in concert with technical experts, making policy decisions without 
public input strongly suggests the need for an increasingly democratic approach to those 
decisions. When it comes to issues of public health, toxic waste storage, nuclear contaminants, 
catastrophic climate change, etc., communication and science-policy scholars have 
documented a systematic marginalization of non-expert voices 
 In Acting in an Uncertain World, Callon et al. (2001) offer one such possibility with 
their notion of “hybrid forums.” Hybrid forums are open spaces where groups can come 
together to discuss technical options involving the collective. These forums are termed 
“hybrid” because 
the groups involved and the spokespersons claiming to represent them are heterogeneous, and may 
include experts, politicians, technicians, and laypersons. They are also hybrid because the questions 
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and problems taken up are addressed at different levels and domains, from ethics to economic and 
including physiology, nuclear physics, and electromagnetism. (Callon et al., 2001, p. 18)  
Hybrid forums are Callon et al.’s answer to the problem of technical democracy; they provide 
inclusive spaces where issues of science and science-related policy can be discussed and 
adjudicated. Effective forums must both enact a hybridity of inclusion, and also a hybridity of 
decision-making authority. That is they must include representation of the wide array of social, 
political, ethical, and economic issues while also distributing decision-making authority among 
the various stakeholders present. 
 In contrast, Collins and Evans (2002) characterize the second wave of science studies 
as devoted to near-total delegitimization of the scientific enterprise and its cultural authority. 
The second wave of STS is very familiar to rhetoricians under the rubrics of the social studies 
of scientific knowledge (SSK), the Strong Programme, and Actor-Network Theory. Scholars 
like Barry Barnes, David Bloor, and John Henry, Steven Shapin and Simon Shafer, Donna 
Haraway, and Evelyn Fox Keller recognized the profoundly undemocratic posture of scientific 
elitism and worked diligently to deconstruct the foundations of scientific inquiry and its 
presupposed special access to the truth. From a policy perspective, this approach legitimizes all 
opinions—regardless of expertise or experience. As such, the second wave of science studies is 
the foundation on which manufactured scientific controversies or George W. Bush’s approach 
to scientific inquiry can be justified. 
 Building on their characterization of the first and second waves, Collins and Evans 
(2002) argue for a third wave of inquiry where SSK is replaced with social studies of 
experience and expertise (SEE). For Collins and Evans, the proposed third wave is not merely 
descriptive but necessarily normative. They argue that STS scholars should work to build more 
ethical and effective models for science policy debate—models that incorporate a more 
nuanced notion of expertise that would solve many of the problems of waves one and two. In 
developing a hierarchy or continuum of expertise, scholars and policy makers can create a 
system that enfranchises multiple expert classes—not just elite scientists—while avoiding the 
scientific elitism of wave one and the total inclusion of wave two. 
 Drawing from their model, Collins and Evans (2002) develop a four-part taxonomy of 
expertise that reflects the importance of including non-credentialed or experience-based 
experts. As the terms suggest, these are experts who have direct experience with the technical 
issues at hand but not the typical MD or PhD appended to their name. In developing this 
taxonomy, the authors explore now canonical work in science policy studies such as Brian 
Wynne’s (1989) exploration of Cumbrian sheep farmers. In the example of Cumbrian sheep 
farmers, scientists working for the government of the United Kingdom were working to 
mitigate against the possible dangers that would arrive from the introduction of radioactive 
waste from the Chernobyl Incident into the UK food supply. As part of their efforts, they 
provided a document of livestock management guidelines to Cumbrian farmers. These 
guidelines, however, were developed without consulting the farmers and ultimately advocated 
an unfeasible strategy. Such examples demonstrate the manifest need for certain types of 
experience-based experts to participate in public policy decisions (in contrast to wave one), but 
in no way imply that a public opinion poll would generate more ethical or effective results 
(wave two). In rhetorical studies, Tarla Rai Peterson and Cristi Choat Horton (1995) have 
made the same argument with respect to the inclusion of farmers in land management policy. 
 While Collins and Evans (2002) do not seek to entirely bar non-expert classes from the 
debate, they do argue that only expert classes should be participants in questions of scientific 
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uncertainty. They divide decision making into technical and value spheres. The broader (not 
just research) pantheon of experts contributes to addressing scientific controversies, and all 
stakeholders contribute to determining the societal values which will engage with scientific 
consensus in the formation of public policy.  
 Despite the broad availability of scholarship in rhetoric, STS, STP, and SEE demanding 
a more democratic approach to scientific and technical decision making, a more recent trend 
has been to question the fundamental assumptions that lead to such work. In her recent essay 
“Manufactured Scientific Controversy: Science, Rhetoric, and Public Debate,” Leah Ceccarelli 
(2011) raises serious concerns about the uninhibited inclusion of non-experts in technical 
decision-making. Exploring the dangerous role of manufactured scientific controversies in 
cases such as AIDS research in Africa, global climate change, and intelligent design vs. 
evolution in school curricula, she argues that the inclusion of non-experts has resulted in 
misrepresentations about a supposed lack of consensus in the scientific community. What is, 
perhaps, most troubling in these cases is the strategic use of something very much like 
rhetoricians’ own arguments in the pursuit of manufactured controversy. That is, when 
challenged, those who would invent controversy argue that the marginalization of their voices 
is an undemocratic act. 
 In this paper, we take seriously three sometimes conflicting concerns: 1) the 2nd wave 
demand for democratization of science, 2) the (post-) 3rd wave concerns over the dangers of 
democratization, and 3) STP/STS scholar’s concerns that many technical experts with valuable 
contributions to make are unwilling and/or disincentivized to participate in political decision 
making. Our interrogation of the case of Avastin highlights the interrelated nature of these 
issues as well as the need for serious efforts to adjudicate them.  
3. THE AVASTIN STORY 
Avastin is what is known as an angiogenesis inhibitor. That means that rather than act directly 
on a tumor by shrinking it or limiting its growth, it inhibits the formation of new blood vessels 
that would bring vital nutrients to a growing cancer. As such, it has been widely hailed as in 
important weapon in the fight against various metastatic cancers. Originally approved by the 
FDA for the treatment of colorectal cancer in 2004, Avastin was the first angiogensis inhibitor 
developed and available on the market (National Cancer Institute, n.d.). Given its novelty and 
purported efficacy, it has been a widely popular in the treatment of a variety of cancers 
including colorectal, ovarian, and breast. 
 As previously mentioned, in 2008, the FDA approved Avastin specifically for the 
treatment of breast cancer under the accelerated approval process. The typical FDA drug 
approval process frequently requires many years of study. Under the normal process, proposed 
drugs must endure four phases of clinical trials designed to assess their safety, efficacy, and 
proper dosage (FDA, n.d. a). Recognizing that the rigorous and lengthy nature of this process 
may delay approval beyond the lifespan of many current patients with terminal disorders, in 
1992, the FDA launched the accelerated approval process. This process allows pharmaceuticals 
manufacturers and research clinicians to develop Phase II and III RCTs designed to assess 
“surrogate endpoints” (FDA, n.d. b). A surrogate endpoint is a methodological outcome 
designed to serve as a proxy for the gold standard measure. So, in the case of cancer studies, 
the gold standard is increasing the lifespan of patients (known of as “overall survival”). Tumor 
shrinkage can be considered a surrogate endpoint in that it suggests the patients will live 
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longer. The accelerated approval process requires, upon approval, another round of 
confirmatory trials designed to assess whether or not the surrogate endpoint actually correlates 
with the gold standard.  
 Pursuant to the regulations surrounding this process, Genentech conducted two 
confirmatory trials—named AVADO (Pivot et al., 2009) and RIBBON1 (Robert et al., 2009) 
designed to fully demonstrate the safety and efficacy of Avastin for the treatment of breast 
cancer. In late 2010 the results of these studies were presented to the Oncologic Drug Advisory 
Committee (ODAC), a division of CDER. ODAC determined that AVADO and RIBBON1 
failed to confirm the safety and clinical benefit of Avastin, and on December 16th, 2010 the 
breast cancer indication was revoked. It should be noted here that revoking the indication for 
one specific cancer does not constitute removal from the market. Avastin is still legally 
available. In fact, it can even be prescribed for the treatment of breast cancer on an “off label” 
basis. However, since the FDA no longer specifically indicates Avastin for breast cancer, many 
insurance companies will not cover the cost of the drug for their breast cancer customers. This 
is a very significant issue given that Avastin can cost up to $55,000/year (Mayer, 2004).  
 Following ODAC’s revocation of the breast cancer approval, Genentech filed an appeal 
with the FDA and was granted a public hearing to air its case. As mentioned above this hearing 
took place on June 28th and 29th, 2011. For the purposes of this meeting CDER convened a 
special ODAC consisting of five oncology research clinicians, one patient representative, and 
one non-voting industry representative, a physician employed the pharmaceuticals corporation 
AstraZeneca. In addition to ODAC, the hearing participants included an affirmative1 
presentation team composed of representatives from CDER, a negative presentation team of 
Genentech representatives, and a litany of testifying so-called “non-parties” who are largely 
patients, clinicians, and advocacy group representatives. At the beginning of the Day 1, the 
presiding office (Karen Midthun) outlined the four key issues the hearing was to address:  
(1) Do the AVADO and RIBBON 1 trials [fail] to verify the clinical benefit of Avastin for 
the breast cancer indication for which it was approved? 
(2) Does the available evidence on Avastin demonstrate that the drug has not been shown 
to be effective for the breast cancer indication for which it was approved? 
(3) Does the available evidence on Avastin demonstrate that the drug has not been shown 
to be safe for the breast cancer indication for which it was approved and that Avastin 
has not been shown to present a clinical benefit that justifies the risks associated with 
use of the product for this indication? 
(4) If the Commissioner agrees with the grounds for withdrawal set out in Issue 1, Issue 2 
or Issue 3, should the FDA nevertheless continue the approval of the breast cancer 
indication while the sponsor designs and conducts additional studies intended to verify 
the drug’s clinical benefit?  
The appeal hearings lasted from approximately 8:00am to 3:30pm for two consecutive days. In 
order to address these issues, the proceedings began with the presentation of non-parties 
wherein 35 non-party testifiers were each given three minutes to testify. Following non-party 
testimony CDER was given two hours to make the affirmative case and ODAC and Genentech 
were each allotted an hour to cross-examine the CDER presenters. On Day 2, Genentech was 
                                                
1  Since this is an appeal hearing, “affirmative” refers to being in favor of maintaining the revocation.  
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given two hours to present the negative case and ODAC and CDER were each given an hour to 
cross-examine. At the end of the hearing, the ODAC committee members publically voted on 
each of the four key issues and provided an individual justification for their vote. For each of 
the four key issues, the vote was unanimous in CDER’s favor. That is, ODAC voted to 
maintain the revocation of the breast cancer indication. It should be noted that the results of 
this hearing are not binding and advisory only. The ultimate decision fell to a single individual, 
the Commissioner of the FDA, Margaret Hamburg, who affirmed the findings of ODAC and 
finalized the revocation of Avastin’s breast cancer indication.  
4. DYNAMIC STASES IN THE AVASTIN HEARING 
While we will eventually return to the problem of expertise in the Avastin Hearing, our 
analysis must begin with the central role of stases as points of contention. Our analysis has 
identified several stasis questions as the key points of contention upon which the Avastin 
Hearing hinged. As rhetorical scholars are well aware, traditional stases include 1) conjectural 
or questions of fact, 2) definitional or questions of definition, 3) qualitative or questions of 
value, and 4) translative or questions of jurisdiction. We interpret the key issues offered at the 
beginning of Day 1 by Dr. Karen Midthun as stasis questions. Issues 1, 2 and 3 are ostensibly 
and primarily intended to be conjectural in nature: Does Avastin benefit breast cancer patients? 
Is it safe? Is it effective? However, it has been widely recognized by the medical community 
(without the rhetorical jargon) that these conjectural questions are very complex and difficult 
to answer (D’Agostio, 2011; Pollack; 2010; Twombly, 2011). As we will describe in further 
detail, the establishment of fact regarding efficacy or safety is predicated on very particular 
understandings of what it means to be effective or what it means to be safe within a long 
tradition of clinical research. In short, the Avastin Hearing’s key conjectural questions require 
first attending to definitional questions. And those definitional questions are further predicated 
on jurisdictional stasis. Understanding such deliberative complexity requires a more nuanced 
approach to stasis theory than provided by classical thinkers such as Hermagoras or Cicero.  
 Recent scholarship in rhetorical studies has begun a project to update stasis theory to 
account for the nature of debate in science, healthcare and health policy (Fahnestock & Secor, 
1998; Graham & Herndl, 2011; Prelli, 2005). In his 2005 chapter analyzing the discourse of 
spousal violence policy, Prelli offers a new, more elaborate, stasis taxonomy that adds what he 
dubs “superior stases” to the preexisting four classical stases. His superior stases include: 
evidential, interpretive, evaluative, and methodological. To this taxonomy Graham and Herndl 
(2011) add a practical superior stasis in order to account for interrupting questions addressing 
issues of technical praxis that fall outside the laboratory. For both Prelli and Graham and 
Herndl, superior stases coordinate with the classical or “inferior” stases to provide a 16- (for 
Prelli) or 20- (for Graham and Herndl) point taxonomy of stases, e.g., the methodological-
qualitative, the practical-conjectural, etc. Such taxonomies provide one very useful way of 
exploring the nature of stases in the course of debate.  
 So while an initial examination of the four key motivating issues set out by Dr. 
Midthun for debate seem to suggest that the Avastin Hearing’s deliberations hinge upon (a) 
conjectural questions of safety and efficacy and (b) definitional questions concerning clinical 
endpoint (e.g., overall survival), what lies at the heart of these four key issues is a lack of 
agreement about what kinds of evidence carry rhetorical weight. Tentatively, we have called 
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these moments nested stases— stasis points that, upon deeper investigation, unfold into a kind 
of meta moment whereupon the terms of the debate are not yet agreed upon.  
 For instance, at the discursive level, the following argumentative move might be 
understood only in terms of the conjectural stasis. “Further, the available data fail to 
demonstrate that Avastin improves health-related quality of life outcomes in patients with 
metastatic breast cancer.” This argumentative move constitutes a question of fact—the data fail 
to demonstrate X. Naturally, then, an argument that ensues will involve discussion about 
whether or not the data do demonstrate X. What evolves from this utterance, however, is a 
whole host of argumentative grounds that attend to the terms of the debate. Specifically, 
participants deliberate about what data are actually available? What constitutes failure to 
demonstrate? What counts as an improvement and how is health-related quality of life 
different from some other quality of life? What are outcomes? Who gets to decide the 
definitions and measures for these constructs? Participants who engage with this single static 
utterance must somehow assert themselves in one or more of the nested static uncertainties at 
work beneath it.  
 Our analysis of the Avastin Hearing transcripts identified many nested stasis moments. 
Most of these moments were confrontational, or part of an effort to discredit one form of 
testimony in favor of another, as, for instance, when Genentech’s Vice President of Global 
Product Development and Chief Medical Officer argues that “the absence of evidence is not 
evidence of absence” (“Proposal to Withdraw Approval for the Breast Cancer Indication for 
Bevacizumab” FDA Public Hearing Transcripts, 2011, Day 2, p. 178; hereinafter, “Avastin 
Hearing”), or when a breast cancer survivor asks, “[W]hat endpoint then is sufficient for your 
approval? Months, years? Despite potential side effects from Avastin, metastatic breast cancer 
has only one, death. Certainly, Avastin can do no worse” (Priscilla Howard, Survivor, Avastin 
Hearing Day 1, p. 38). 
 The fundamental question undergirding Genentech’s VP and CMO’s claim centers 
around not just the existence (or not) of evidence, but what will be recognized and then 
validated as evidence. Breast cancer survivor, Priscilla Howard, does not just ask how they 
define an endpoint. She asks them to find value in that endpoint as it compares with death. 
These are not mere points of indecision or disagreement. These are moments of fundamental 
disconnect. Each of these examples suggests that only certain frames of reference should be 
considered valuable.  
 While we could provide a 16- or 20-point taxonomic analysis (à la Prelli or Graham 
and Herndl) of the key issues in the Avastin Hearing, we think a more fruitful approach comes 
from what we are calling “dynamic stasis mapping.” As opposed to the taxonomic approach 
that isolates individual stases from the flow of argument, dynamic stasis mapping seeks to 
capture the dynamic and often nested relationship among stases within the flow of debate. This 
will allow us to more effectively address the aforementioned complexity in the Avastin 
Hearing wherein conjectural questions are predicated on prior definitional and jurisdictional 
stases. Additionally, our dynamic stasis analysis, in tracking the flow of stases in situ allows us 
to interrogate the resolution of stasis questions into new topoi that will be deployed as 
argument progresses. Figure 1 details our dynamic stasis analysis map for the Avastin Hearing. 
It includes multiple orders of nested stases. For example, one can trace the predication of the 
conjectural question “Does Avastin have clinical benefit?” into a definition stasis, “What is 
clinical benefit?” and further into a jurisdictional stasis, “What authorities are qualified to 
define clinical benefit?” Figure 1 also details how each nested stasis question is resolved, 
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during the course of the hearing, into a new topos that contributes to the resolution of the 
surface stases.  
 
Figure 1: Avastin Hearing Dynamic Stasis Map 
In explicating this map, we begin our analysis with the first issue raised in the Avastin 
Hearing: Issue 1: Does Avastin have clinical benefit? As we have already indicated, we 
identify this as a conjectural question. However, as we have also indicated, that question is 
predicated on the definition of “clinical benefit.” However, our analysis of the Avastin Hearing 
indicates an enthymetic approach to that definition. At no point during the debate was there an 
opportunity for all parties to develop a consensus on the meaning of clinical benefit. Indeed, 
the elucidation of key issues by Dr. Midthun demonstrates a tacit acceptance of clinical benefit 
in terms of statistical efficacy. Throughout the hearing, Issue 2a (Is Avastin effective?) was 
treated as a gloss of Issue 1. We identify the lack of opportunity to develop a shared definition 
of clinical benefit as a key problem for the Avastin Hearing and a primary reason for which 
meaningful cross-stakeholder consensus was not achieved. This is an issue we will return to in 
greater detail. First, however, we demonstrate the utility of our nested stasis analysis by 
following the key issues raised under the rubric of statistical efficacy as the definition of 
clinical benefit.  
 As previously mentioned, the majority of the testimony offered during the Avastin 
Hearing was based in the assumption that clinical benefit would be demonstrated as a form of 
statistical efficacy. As with any form of academic research, there are a variety of methods 
available for answering any given question. Effective pharmaceuticals for the treatment of 
breast cancer are no exception. While most discussants agreed that the statistical approach was 
FROM STAKEHOLDERS TO EXPERTS 
 
89 
necessary to determining the efficacy of Avastin, a nested methodological stasis became a 
central point of contention. At issue was whether or not FDA approval could be based on 
progression-free survival (PFS) instead of overall survival (OS). Take for example the 
following two passages from the presentation of nonparties. The first comes from a physician 
presentation in favor of Avastin retaining its approval. He argues, “PFS is often the most 
objective and, hence, most valid endpoint in a clinical trial” (Avastin Hearing, Day 1 p. 46). A 
contrasting example comes from an advocate for SHARE Cancer Support who denigrates the 
value of progression-free survival in order to argue for the revocation of Avastin’s breast 
cancer indication: “[P]rogression-free survival is an endpoint that benefits women with 
metastatic breast cancer only if it predicts overall survival or demonstrates improved quality of 
life” (Avastin Hearing, Day 1, p. 81).  
 Overall survival is typically considered the gold standard in oncological research. 
Essentially, it is a measure of if and how much longer patients in the treatment arm lived 
longer than patients in the placebo group. So if a clinical trial returns an overall survival value 
of three months, that means, on average, patients in the treatment group lived three months 
longer than patients in the control group. Progression-free survival, in contrast, measures how 
long the drug delays tumor growth. A progression-free survival of three months means that 
tumor growth was delayed three months in the treatment group, but it does not assess whether 
members of the treatment group lived longer than patients in the placebo arm. The key Avastin 
trials returned what some considered acceptable progression-free survival numbers. However, 
those trails failed to demonstrate efficacy as measured by overall survival.  
 To make matters worse, in the clinical research context, whether or not a drug is 
effective is frequently determined in dialogue with the question of its safety. While several 
measures are available for assessing safety, CDER establishes certain gold standard measures 
for each class of drugs. Within the framework of the Avastin Hearing, the primary benchmark 
for safety was “hazard ratio.” As CDER representative Dr. Padzur explains,  
This is the same concept as relative risk. It compares the risk of an event or outcome in one group 
with a risk of that event or outcome in another group. A hazard ratio of 1 would indicate that the risk 
in each group is identical. In clinical trials, a hazard ratio less than 1 generally indicates a favorable 
effect was seen in the treatment arm. (Avastin Hearing, Day 1, pp. 132-133) 
A hazard ratio is a complex statistical approach to determining whether or not patients taking a 
drug under study are more likely to suffer serious side effects or death than the patients taking 
a placebo. As Dr. Padzur indicates, in order to establish safety for a given drug, a hazard ratio 
of less than one is required. Although such a stipulation might seem to easily establish the 
safety of a given drug, it does not. Hazard ratios are frequently determined in statistical 
dialogue with clinical endpoints (measures of efficacy). This complication is of extreme 
importance in the case of Avastin because depending on how a clinical trial was powered—to 
use either overall survival or progression-free survival as a meaningful clinical endpoint—it 
not only determined if Avastin was effective, but it also determined if it was safe. That is, 
when the hazard ratio calculations included progression-free survival, the ratio was always less 
than 1, but when it used overall survival, it was almost always more than 1.  
 As Figure 1 details, the Avastin Hearing and the FDA Commissioner ultimately 
determined that overall survival is the preferred measure for statistical efficacy. In resolving 
this underlying question, the answers to the surface stases became immediately clear: no, 
Avastin is not effective, nor is it safe. Given the tacit reduction of clinical benefit to statistical 
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efficacy, this automatically necessitated a negative finding in terms of Avastin’s clinical 
benefit. However, as we mentioned above, at no point during the Avastin Hearing did the FDA 
provide an opportunity for definitional consensus regarding clinical benefit. Many of the so-
called nonparties sought to offer a different foundation for definition.  
 Given the lack of formal opportunity to develop a consensus-based definition of clinical 
benefit and the tacit acceptance of clinical benefit-qua-statistical efficacy by the FDA and key 
parties, arguments seeking to open up the possibility of alternative definitions were grounded 
in debate over the authority of other definitions. This tension was readily apparent in the 
testimony of nonparty patients who would frequently argue that they were “more than an 
anecdote.” Nonparty patients would often acknowledge that their claims would be pitted 
against constructs like overall survival, and that they lacked the necessary means by which 
they could argue for the soundness of their definitions for what counts as clinical benefit. The 
conflict between patient testimony and statistical discourse was not merely a preemptive 
counter-argument in patient testimony; it was also a recurrent feature of ODAC discourse. At 
multiple points in the voting and justification section of the Avastin Hearing, the distinction 
between evidence and anecdote was used to justify decisions against Avastin. For example, 
“The research evidence does not demonstrate a clinical benefit. And even though we have 
anecdotal information, we don’t show any improvement in quality of life or in overall 
survival” (Avastin Hearing, Day 2, p. 237). Another example comes from Dr. Skeers who 
argued,  
I was once taught that the plural of anecdote is not data. So we each have one story of somebody who 
felt better while responding, but if the facts don’t support that, then that’s not something that we can 
rely on. (Avastin Hearing, Day 2, p. 234)  
 This distinction between anecdote and data is an overriding concern in sections that 
question the authority of patient testimony. However, the anecdote/data divide also serves to 
delegitimize another so-called nonparty class: the non-researching healthcare practitioner. 
Since the Avastin Hearing tacitly recognized statistical evidence as primary, it does not just 
discount individual patients’ reports as anecdotal, it also discounts the experiential or case-
related testimony of the practicing clinician. In the following passage from the Presentation of 
Nonparties, clinical oncologist Dr. Powderly attempts to overcome this prejudice and justify 
the inclusion of experiential insight in the face of the hegemony of evidence-based medicine.   
CDER had commented that Avastin, quote, “just shrinks radiographic tumors” and had no, quote, 
“clinical evidence of benefit.” It is self-evident that in the practice of oncology medicine, tumor 
shrinkage, which was seen in the E2100 and other trials, is directly correlated with a decrease in 
tumor pain. Although tumor pain may have not been captured adequately on quality of life or adverse 
event scale forms on case report forms, that still does not negate the oncologic principle that response 
rate and progression-free survival equate to less tumor pain controlled over a longer duration. 
(Avastin Hearing, Day 1, pp. 59-60) 
Despite this articulate plea for the inclusion of experiential evidence, such discourse is still 
written off as merely anecdotal.  
 Many participants recognizing the hegemony of evidence-based medicine sought to 
calibrate their testimony to the scientific approach. For example, one survivor argued, “I wish I 
could provide more than my individual case, as I know there are many variables. However, I 
hope the committee will consider individual experience presented today as we represent the 
story behind the numbers” (Avastin Hearing, Day 1, pp. 30-31). Here the obvious goal is to 
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articulate the survivor’s experience to clinical researchers. Nancy Hauty recognizes the 
importance of evidence-based medicine, but also argues for her testimony to be accepted 
alongside the dominant discourse. Below is another example of such an attempt wherein Dr. 
Ivy Ahmed (vice president of education and outreach for the Cancer Support Community 
organization) seeks to coordinate clinical research with patient experience: 
Despite strong empirical and observed evidence, the FDA contemptuously ignores these women, 
dismissively calling them “anecdotal evidence.” The FDA unscientifically only considers medians 
from its trials. However, the FDA approach misleadingly omits the details behind the medians. Those 
details are vital, changing the picture. Individual patients respond differently to treatments. Medians 
hide this. The super responders fall greatly above the median. (Avastin Hearing, Day 1, p. 88) 
In his detailed stasis heuristic, Prelli (2005) describes the evidential-translative stasis as a 
question concerning “which from among alternative bodies of data and evidence provides the 
best criteria for resolving evidential problems” (p. 306). Elaborating this definition, Graham  
and Herndl (2011) appropriate this construct in their study of pain medicine. In so doing they 
document how the evidential-translative stasis accounts for frequent conflicts between the 
lived experience of illness, practical clinical expertise, and the scientific evidence of clinical 
trials: 
Clinical experience tells the members of the [Midwest Pain Group] that much of their practice works, 
that they have impacts, but the evidence is not recognized. Research into and treatment of pain 
requires heavy reliance on subjective patient report. However, this reliance on subjectivity is in direct 
conflict with the broader project of Western science and its pursuit of objectivity. (p. 157) 
Traditionally the translative stasis addresses questions of venue, i.e., what court is appropriate 
to hear a given case? Following Prelli and Graham and Herndl, we extend the translative stasis 
to account for questions concerning the authority of a source of evidence. These jurisdictional 
issues return us to the opening questions of this article: (1) What are the rhetorical means by 
which expertise is leveraged in health policy, and (2) What are the discursive strategies used to 
delegitimize the expertise of opposing parties?  
5. EXPERTS AND NONPARITIES 
During the Presentation of Nonparties, 34 nonparty representatives were each given three 
minutes to testify to their experiences with and/or opinions on Avastin. Table 1 (below) details 
the number of times each stakeholder code was assigned in the Presentation of Nonparties and 
compares the percentage of contributions by members of each stakeholder class to the 
Presentation of Nonparties and the entire Avastin Hearing. The reported percentages are based 
on coding coverage in the transcripts. So while all Presentation of Nonparties participants had 
the same amount of time allotted, there is a large range in transcribed length based on issues 
like rate of speaking and complexity of vocabulary. For instance, four researchers testified 
during the Presentation of Nonparties, accounting for 4.49% of the total Presentation of 
Nonparties. However, researchers dominated more than 37% of the total hearing. It should be 
noted that some participants were double- or triple-coded for their stakeholder positions. That 
is, some participants were not just researchers, but also healthcare practitioners and advocates 
on behalf of a particular breast cancer organization. 
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Table 1: Stakeholder Representation in the Presentation of Nonparties and Avastin Hearing 
more broadly.  
Stakeholder Status Number in PNP % in PNP % in Entire AH 
Advocate 15 19.03 6.08 
Ally 6 0.66 2.11 
Researcher 4 4.49 37.44 
Healthcare Practitioner 7 10.2 39.08 
Survivor  15 13.69 5.3 
Pharmaceuticals Rep 0 0 16.64 
Policy Representative 0 0 29.25 
 
In particular, we would like to draw the reader’s attention to the discrepancy between the 
Presentation of Nonparties and the entire Avastin Hearing. Advocates and survivors were 
major contributors to debates in the Presentation of Nonparties; however, those contributions 
were almost entirely elided in the broader Avastin Hearing. While the FDA deserves to be 
credited for their decision to include multiple stakeholders, these numbers indicate that not all 
seats at the table, as it were, are equal. The mere inclusion of diverse constituencies does not 
mean that all included parties participate equally in the debate. From these results begin to 
emerge an understanding of the structural inequities in the Avastin Hearing. The FDA has a 
long-standing policy of stakeholder inclusion, particularly with regard to patients. The design 
of the Avastin Hearing sought to enact that policy by providing a roughly equal amount of time 
to formal presentations by nonparties, CDER, and Genentech. That equality was not carried out 
through other procedural formats such as question and answer periods. Specifically, at no point 
were nonparties asked questions and at no point were the questions they asked answered.  
 The relegation of nonparties to their own isolated segment of the hearing suggests a 
marginalization of their voices. The interactions between CDER, ODAC, and Genentech were 
dialogic. There was ongoing presentation and counter-presentation as well as the 
aforementioned opportunities for questioning and rebuttal. Recognized parties were afforded 
the opportunity to present coordinated efforts. However, the Presentation of Nonparties was a 
series of often unrelated three-minute narratives. What this analysis suggests is that the FDA 
does not recognize any form of expertise in the nonparties. Indeed, the very language of 
“parties” and “nonparties” implies designations of interest rather than designations of 
expertise. Furthermore, the design of the Avastin Hearing—much like that of a courtroom—
enacts a focus on interests rather than expertise. The parties are stakeholders. The nonparties 
are stakeholders. They have a viewpoint, a perspective, but they cannot offer actionable 
knowledge on the matter at hand. The ODAC members are the experts. However, this returns 
us to the problem presented in the opening epigraph. No member of the Avastin Hearing 
ODAC was a researcher in breast cancer. Therefore, for many, the findings of ODAC are 
untrusted.  
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 In the language of Callon et al.’s (2001) hybrid forums, then, we can understand this as 
a case where the first, but not the second dimension of hybridity is enacted. The FDA 
succeeded in including marginalized voices (type 1 hybridity), but did not succeed in granting 
those voices equal decision-making status (type 2 hybridity). This type 2 hybridity failure, we 
argue, stems from the stakeholder model of inclusion. While the FDA recognizes that patients 
have a stake, it does not recognize their embodied expertise. As one possible solution, we 
suggest that Collins and Evans (2002) expertise taxonomy might be combined with Callon et 
al.’s (2001) notion of hybrid forums to allow for both types of hybridity.  
6. CONCLUSION: FROM INTERESTS TO EXPERTISE  
Given our findings from both our nested stases analysis of Avastin Hearing transcripts and the 
procedural inequities of the Avastin Hearing itself, we see ways that debates surrounding 
jurisdiction and authority are, at their core, questions about the definition of expertise. As 
previously mentioned, this need for a more nuanced approach to expertise has been recognized 
for some time in science technology and society (STS) scholarship. Collins and Evans (2002) 
develop the following taxonomy of expertise: 
(1) Non-experts: individuals with no credentialed or experience-based knowledge of the issue at 
hand.  
(2) Contributory experts: individuals who participate directly in the processes of scientific inquiry 
designed to develop new knowledge about the issue in dispute.  
(3) Interactional experts: individuals who engage with the developing scientific understanding of 
the given issues in practical or applied settings.  
(4) Referred experts: individuals who have credentials or experience in an area of investigation or 
practice so closely related to the area in question that their insights would be considered 
relevant and valuable. (p. 254-256) 
Ultimately, Collins and Evans argue that only expert classes should be participants in questions 
of scientific uncertainty. However, they do not seek to entirely eliminate nonexpert classes 
from the debate. In a move that parallels Ceccarelli’s (2011) argument for a shift from is to 
ought, Collins and Evans suggest that nonexperts, as members of the public, have every right 
to participate in discussions about policy and value regarding scientific uncertainty. But they 
also suggest that as nonexperts their contributions to the scientific controversy are of 
questionable value. It is worth noting, at this point, that Collins and Evans’ model also 
delegitimizes the role of scientists without specific expertise to the question at hand. The mere 
fact of being a scientist does not confer expertise. Only experience with the technical issue of 
the day (or a highly related issue in the case of referred experts) would accomplish that goal. 
We believe that such a model of expertise may provide important insights into the discursive 
means of policy dispute in the case of Avastin.  
 Specifically, we argue that Collins and Evans’ normative vision of expertise might help 
to shift the FDA’s preference for interests as an indicator of jurisdictional prowess (or 
authority) toward experiences as that which best demonstrate “expertise.” Rather than 
assigning Avastin Hearing participants a stakeholder status of “nonparty” or “party,” we ought 
to reconceive of participants in light of Collins and Evans’ expertise categories (see Table 2). 
Under this taxonomy, some participants enact contributory expertise, others enact interactional 
expertise, while others enact referred expertise. 
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Table 2: Breast Cancer Expertise—Avastin Hearing Stakeholder Mapping 
EXPERTISE CATEGORY STAKEHOLDER 
Core Set/ Contributory Expertise (CE) Breast Cancer Researchers 
Experience Based/ Interactional Expertise (IE) Breast Cancer Healthcare Practitioners  
Breasts Cancer Survivors  
Allies2 
Referred Expertise (RE) Other Oncology Researchers  
Other Cancer Healthcare Practitioners  
Non-Expert (NE) Allies 
Advocates 
Policy Professionals 
Pharmaceuticals Representatives 
 
Moreover, what Collins and Evans’ taxonomy of expertise affords us is a more unified 
understanding of expertise as shared and collaborative; that is, no single person, unit, or 
institutional entity possesses absolute expertise. Rather, it is in the richness of a deliberative 
moment like the Avastin Hearing wherein various categories of expertise meet, deliberate, and 
negotiate future action. Under this taxonomy, the preconditions for more democratic discourse 
or deliberation are met—participants’ expertise no longer hinges on their having been assigned 
a party/non-party status based on interest.  
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